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ABSTRACT
The Comparative Efficiency of Public and Private Provision of Postsecondary Education
in U.S. National Universities
by
David L. Talley
May 2018
Chair: Danny Bellenger
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business
The research uses postsecondary education in the United States as a test case for broader
claims of superior efficiency of production from private sector producers as compared to public
sector producers. Using linear regression and structural equation modeling on secondary data
from 230 national universities, I provide evidence that private universities are more efficient in
production of postsecondary education than public universities, and that the relationship is not
mediated by competition. Using qualitative analysis of semi-structured depth interviews with
both private and public university administrators, I provide evidence that personal motivation is
also not a mediator of the relationship, but bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency likely is.
The research contributes to knowledge by examining and clarifying the explanatory
power and boundary conditions of x-inefficiency, expectancy theory, and budget-maximizing
theory in the context of higher education. The research contributes to practice by offering
guidance to both public and private university administrators on improving efficiency. Policy
recommendations are provided with regard to higher education generally, as are
recommendations for future research.
INDEX WORDS: Efficiency, Education, Public, Private, University
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I

INTRODUCTION

In non-academic discourse, especially in discussions of politics or government, one often
encounters the claim that the private sector is more efficient in terms of producing goods and
services than the public sector. The assertion is frequently made with little or no supporting
evidence, which is unfortunate, because the academic literature provides mixed support for such
claims at best (Goodman and Loveman 1991) (Pier Vernon and Wicks 1974) (Sav 2012). Many
public policy debates proceed based on this untested assertion, and potentially reach conclusions
which may be inaccurate if the underlying assumption is incorrect, or which may only hold under
certain conditions. It is worth pausing to examine this foundational assertion before proceeding
to larger policy debates about the appropriate role of government in production, or the wisdom of
privatization as a tool of economic policy.
Understanding if, and under what conditions, the private sector may be more efficient in
production than the public sector has economic, policy, and management implications in the
United States. Although the U.S. is generally regarded as a model free market economy, the
government still plays a significant role in the economy at the federal, state, and local levels.
This is true not just in terms of providing regulatory oversight, but also in terms of production of
both goods and services in direct competition with the private sector. Examples of such
competition include providing hospital care to the sick and injured; provision of incarceration
and rehabilitation services for prisoners; production and distribution of electricity and water;
provision of primary, secondary, and postsecondary education; road construction, maintenance,
and operation; golf course operation; swimming pool operation; trash collection and disposal;
letter and package delivery; and many others.
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President Trump’s administration has strongly signaled a desire for the federal
government to privatize portions of the economy and to adopt behaviors of the private sector to
operate more efficiently. The administration has recommended the use of public-private
partnerships to encourage private investment in public infrastructure to stimulate economic
growth and help repair the country’s deteriorating roads and bridges (Levitt and Mulholland
2017). The president has suggested privatizing the nation’s air traffic control system, claiming
this could lead to more efficient outcomes for travelers (Shaper 2017). For government
operations which cannot be privatized, the administration has created an Office of American
Innovation to improve operations by closely consulting with the private sector (Furan 2017).
Detecting the presence of a relative efficiency gap between public and private provision
of goods and services and providing evidence of the underlying reasons for that gap could prove
useful in improving the efficiency of the overall U.S. economy. Armed with that information,
public managers would know that efficiency gains are possible, either by having the public
sector emulate the behavior of the private sector, or through privatization if the underlying
causes implied that the private sector behavior could not be effectively emulated.
In the arena of higher education, efficiency has received an increasing amount of both
popular and academic attention. As increases in tuition continue to consistently outpace normal
inflationary growth, policy makers and prospective students are increasingly worried about
college affordability and access. This has accelerated pressure on universities to reign in the rate
of tuition growth, and to do so without sacrificing quality. Student debt is quickly becoming a
financial burden for young graduates that threatens to overwhelm their ability to repay their
financial obligations.
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Understanding how to make a class of inefficient universities operate more like efficient
universities would have benefits beyond just the immediate financial implications of saving
tuition dollars for current students. To the extent the trend in runaway tuition increases can be
checked by increases in university efficiency, society benefits by preserving the concept that
“college is worth it.” A university education has long been considered a gateway to the middle
class, and to the extent that view can be maintained, society will continue to enjoy the benefits of
a well-educated population such as a more highly skilled work force, higher disposable incomes,
additional income tax revenues, and reductions in social ills associated with lack of education
such as poor health outcomes and higher rates of crime (Ross and Van Willigen 1997).
Attempting to identify and explain the underlying causes for a hypothesized efficiency
gap between public and private producers of goods and services is a very broad task given the
large areas of competition between the two sectors. This paper focuses on production of a single
service as a test case for the broader assertion that the private sector is more efficient in
production. Specifically, the current research examines the provision of postsecondary education
from national universities as a specific case of private organizational efficiency versus public
organizational efficiency. The current research is a two-stage study designed to address two
research questions. Stage one focuses on answering the primary research question; are private
organizations more efficient than public sector organizations? Stage two focuses on a secondary
research question; why are private sector organizations more efficient organizations?
This research contributes to scientific knowledge by providing evidence to support and
clarify theoretical explanations of why private producers may be more efficient than government
producers. The research contributes to practice by illuminating aspects under a government
producer’s control which can help increase efficiency.
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II
I.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Definition and Measurement of Efficiency
A useful first step in addressing issues of efficiency is to define the term. Economists

have historically dedicated effort toward the study of allocative efficiency, and deviations
therefrom. Briefly, allocative efficiency refers to a situation in which prices are truly reflective
of the actual costs of producing a good or service, and therefore all the resources in an economy
are utilized in the production of the good or service that is most valued by society. Smith first
articulated this concept in the metaphor of the “invisible hand,” (Smith 1776).
In contrast, the concept of productive efficiency encapsulates producing the maximum
amount of output with the smallest amount of inputs possible. This concept is normally what
people mean when they discuss efficiency in terms of public versus private production. A
competitive market achieves economic productive efficiency when firms are producing at the
minimum average total cost. Productive efficiency is closely related to technical efficiency.
Technical efficiency refers to maximizing output with a given set of inputs, whereas productive
efficiency allows the producer to vary their inputs to minimize costs. Farrell authored the
foundational work on defining and measuring productive efficiency (Farrell 1957), and he
advocates that productive efficiency, which he terms “price efficiency,” is a superior construct to
technical efficiency precisely because it accounts for management decisions regarding the
appropriate mix of inputs to use in production.
The proper definition (Massy 2011) and measurement (Kosor 2013) of efficiency in
higher education have been the subjects of much debate. Massy provides a comprehensive
discussion of the conceptual advantages and disadvantages to several measures for both
productivity and efficiency in higher education. The ideal conceptualization of efficiency, he
argues, should recognize that universities produce multiple outcomes. The learning that takes
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place in individual classes is an outcome unto itself, beyond the more easily quantifiable
outcome of awarded degrees. Kosor concurs that the multiple outcomes produced by universities
complicate the measurement of higher education outcomes but extends the argument by
differentiating between the teaching and research outputs of the university.
Massy also points to the issue of controlling for educational quality as a complicating
factor in defining efficiency. Traditionally, researchers have either used the cost of education as
a proxy for quality or have controlled for quality with more direct quality measurements such as
performance on a standardized post-university test like the Collegiate Learning Assessment.
Kosor summarizes the two main methods used for evaluating efficiency in higher
education. Stochastic frontier analysis is a statistical tool developed in the late 1970s (Aigner
Lovell and Schmidt 1977). Stochastic frontier analysis is an econometric estimation technique
that attempts to model inefficiency as systematic error in the approach of optimizing producers to
maximizing their input. The method relies on the concept of benchmarking or comparing a
producer’s performance to a theoretically possible efficiency frontier. Data envelopment
analysis is a non-parametric tool developed around the same time (Charnes et al 1978). The
technique is similar in approach to stochastic frontier analysis, although the benchmark used is
not a theoretically possible efficiency frontier, but a “best in class” producer. A third method
uses regression based on the education production function literature. Here, the analysis takes
into consideration individual student characteristics to help explain their knowledge outcomes.
This provides a richer analysis but focuses the individual student level of analysis.
Despite calls for clarity and proposed national benchmark models (Powell et al 2012), the
United States still does not rely on a single, authoritative source for data and measures of
efficiency in higher education. This lack of precise definitions and clear consensus on
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measurement for efficiency creates difficulty in understanding exactly what factors influence
efficiency.
The current research adopts a broad definition of efficiency. Spending per degree is the
conceptual basis, but more specifically the measure of efficiency proposed here is core expenses
per degree awarded. This definition captures the broadest concept of economic productive
efficiency for which data is readily available.
Core expenses include university spending on instruction, research, public service,
academic support, institutional support, student services, and other core expenses not otherwise
classified. Students select universities for a variety of reasons beyond instruction, so the measure
includes other expenditure categories because universities must expend funds on research and in
other areas to attract and maintain the faculty required to attract quality students and maintain
high educational standards.
Degrees awarded is used as the denominator in this operationalization of efficiency. The
advantage of using degrees awarded is that it is a broad measure of the output of universities.
Conceptually, the largest drawback to using this denominator is that it excludes learning
outcomes that do not result in an awarded degree.
II.1 Factors of Production Influence Efficiency
Broadly, efficiency is a measure of the relationship between inputs and outputs. In
classical economic thought, the only factors of production available to generate consumable
outputs are land, labor, and capital. The production of lasers, submarines, toothpicks, and all
other goods and services result from the combination of different types of land, labor, and
capital. Therefore, the factors which influence efficiency within an industry will be context-
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specific to that industry, because different industries are interested in using different inputs to
create different outputs.
As an example, the efficiency of agricultural production is typically represented in terms
of crop yield divided by land, farm equipment, fertilizer, and the labor of the farmers involved in
production. Efficiency in the production of tobacco involves pounds of tobacco produced from
inputs of land, tractors and wagons, fertilizer and pesticides, and the labor of farmers (Abay
Miran and Gunden 2004). Efficiency in the production of rice is measured in much the same
way; the only difference being the measures for crop yields and the specific types of land and
machinery involved in production (Anang Backman and Sipilainen 2016).
The production of cruise ship vacations is considerably different than the production of
agricultural products. The inputs for the production function of cruise ship vacations do not
focus on land, but here capital plays a much more important role in terms of the design and
features of the cruise ship, and labor in terms of the quality and number of crewmembers
available to assist passengers (Gregoriou Gultek and Demirer 2017). Beyond different cost
inputs, though, there is no standardization for the output of services such as cruise ship vacations
as there is for agricultural products. It is possible to simply count the number of vacations
provided as a measure of output but doing so would assume that all cruise ship vacation
experiences are equal, and that the level of satisfaction enjoyed by all guests was similar. This
additional complication of defining and measuring output to capture differences in quality will
be addressed later in the Methodology section.
It follows that the factors which influence efficiency in higher education are related to the
inputs and outputs of institutes of higher education. With respect to inputs, compensation to
faculty and staff drive most of the costs incurred by universities, especially for teaching-oriented
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universities (Davis 2012). Technology also contributes to the educational production function,
although the promise of online education has not yet materialized in terms of “bending down the
cost curve,” (Deming Goldin and Katz 2015). Interestingly, large, private, for-profit institutions
of higher education appear to have been the most aggressive in adopting online education,
whereas public and private non-profit universities appear to have been more cautious in
adoption, perhaps because of a perceived lack of quality in the education received through online
delivery.
The academic literature on the higher education production function focuses primarily on
the effort and quality of students and the effort and quality of faculty and staff (Dolan and
Schmidt 1994). There is some theoretical and empirical evidence that the physical capital plant
at universities is also an important part of the production function of higher education (Dolan and
Schmidt 1994) (Hopkins 1990).
II.2 Previous Research on Efficiency in Higher Education
Powell and colleagues conducted an interesting study on the relationship between
efficiency and effectiveness in higher education (Powell et al 2012), which serves as a partial
model for the present study. Their research points to a perception, especially amongst university
presidents, of a trade-off between efficiency, effectiveness, and access in higher education. Only
reductions in quality or restrictions in access to students without financial wherewithal can
increase efficiency.
Building on previous research (Bowen 1980), Powell examined the hypothesis that
universities follow the revenue theory of cost. This theory holds that costs will expand to
consume available revenues, in part because society has viewed education as a public good, and
price signals in the market are comparatively weak. One implication of this is that one should
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expect to find radically different costs and levels of efficiency for different universities, because
costs, and subsequently levels of efficiency, are simply a function of available revenues.
Another important implication is that there is little or no incentive to reduce costs and improve
efficiency under this model; the incentive would be to maximize available revenues and then
decide how to allocate those revenues among cost categories.
Research has generally supported Bowen’s revenue theory of cost in a variety of
academic settings. Leslie and colleagues found support for the theory amongst research-focused
universities, especially among public institutions, which implies there are some differences
between public and private universities (Leslie et al 2011). Archibald and Feldman (2011)
provide a counterpoint, arguing that the revenue theory of cost focuses too narrowly on higher
education, and more general theories such as cost disease provide a better explanation for tuition
increases over time. Cost disease refers to the phenomenon of prices rising more quickly than
inflation in industries where capital cannot easily replace labor. Economist Robert Frank
explained cost disease by noting,
“While productivity gains have made it possible to assemble cars with only
a tiny fraction of the labor that was once required, it still takes four musicians nine
minutes to perform Beethoven’s String Quartet in C minor, just as it did in the 19th
century.” (quoted from Bowen 2012).
This is likely true, at least to a certain degree, in higher education. While this is a
convincing argument, the focus of the current research is not the drivers of tuition increases over
time, but with the relationship between the publicness of a university and the efficiency with
which the university provides educational services.
Powell’s team developed a model of higher educational efficiency and effectiveness that
depicted these concepts as functions of institutional characteristics and expenditures.
Institutional characteristics included size as measured by enrollment, Carnegie classification,

10
which measures the highest degree available for student pursuit, and the percentage of students
receiving federal aid. The team measured expenditures as federally reported core expenditures
on research and instruction. Class size, student to faculty ratio, administration to faculty ratio,
teaching load, and faculty satisfaction were the measures for efficiency. Effectiveness measures
included first year retention rates and four and six-year graduation rates. Powell’s model,
depicted in Figure 1, will serve as a basis for modification to answer the present research
questions.
Powell found that, as expected, there was an inverse relationship between efficiency and
effectiveness for universities. More meaningfully though, the research indicated that
institutional characteristics were predictors of both efficiency and effectiveness. Recall that
Powell tested institutional characteristics such as size and classification, but not the publicness of
the universities.
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Figure 1: Powell's Model of Efficiency and Effectiveness

This model requires some modification to address the present research questions. First,
there are two dependent variables in Powell’s model. As I am primarily interested in efficiency,
a control variable for quality will subsume the construct of effectiveness. Secondly, Powell
modeled expenditures as a driver of efficiency using several measures for expenditures based on
aggregate spending reported by universities.
I argue that expenditures per award are a broader, more appropriate measure of efficiency
than are class size, and professor or administrator to student ratios. Expenditures per award
encapsulate all aspects of the educational experience that class size and ratios might ignore.
Furthermore, it is better to use class size and student ratios as controls to help explain variations
in expenditures per award than the reverse.
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With these modifications, we turn to understanding some mediating variables through
which inefficiency may be transmitted from the institutional characteristic of being a public
university through to an outcome such as being less efficient in terms of spending per award.
The academic literature contains three compelling theoretical explanations for why public
universities may be less efficient than their private counterparts.
II.3 Causes of Inefficiency for Hypothesized Model
The production function for higher education, and for all other goods and services, begins
with the factors of production. For higher education, the labor of faculty and staff, and to a
lesser extent the capital stock of the university in terms of buildings, equipment, and technology
are all important inputs to producing higher education. If the markets for all these inputs are
approximately competitive, then universities should be able to acquire them for the same price.
If that is true, then why would anyone expect public universities to be any less efficient than
private universities?
The answer is that while the production function begins with land, labor, and capital; it
certainly does not end there. Economists have long recognized that the way in which managers
combine the factors of production has a significant impact on efficiency. Smith recounts a story
of remarkable gains in the yield of pins produced by workers simply by dividing labor and
specializing in certain areas of production (Smith 1776), a concept which Ford later refined and
exploited on a much larger scale with the advent of the automated production assembly line in
the early 1900s.
Just as managers can improve efficiency through new and innovative ways of combining
the factors of production, so too can they introduce and encourage inefficiency by acting, or
failing to act, in certain ways. There are three strong theoretical explanations that could help
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explain why managers of government producers might behave in ways which lead to less
efficient production than do managers of private enterprises.
Leibenstein was the first to formalize the concept that governments involved in
production would not maximize efficiency (Leibenstein 1966) by coining the term “XInefficiency.” The fundamental argument was that it was the degree of competition that
producers felt which motivated them to behave in ways that were efficient. Government
producers could rely on taxpayer subsidies to prevent them from having to cease operations,
whereas private producers were subject to extreme competition which would result in their
eventual destruction if they did not maximize efficiency. The need to strive and compete, he
argued, disciplined private managers to make the tough choices that governmental managers
would simply not have to make.
This argument is simple, elegant, and convincing. However, contained within it are some
assumptions and boundary conditions which may not make it an entirely satisfactory explanation
for differences in efficiency between public and private universities. First, because disparities in
levels of competition drive X-Inefficiencies, the explanation only makes sense if public
university managers perceive taxpayers will bail them out of inefficient decisions, and that
private university managers feel that the market will punish them for inefficient decisions.
Secondly, the argument presupposes that universities compete for students to a large degree
based on efficiency, and not on some other characteristic such as perceived quality or reputation.
The second possible theoretical explanation for a potential efficiency differential between
public and private production comes from the field of psychology. Expectancy theory holds that
rational self-interest motivates (Vroom 1964). Three elements precede motivation to act. There
must first be expectancy, which means that a person must believe that by increasing their
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individual level of effort, they will be able to improve their performance. The second element is
instrumentality, meaning that a person must believe that by improving their performance they
will be able to achieve a specified outcome. The third element is valence, meaning that the
person must value achieving the outcome, and perceive some reward after having obtained it.
Expectancy theory can be a useful prism through which to view human motivation. With
respect to managerial behavior at public and private universities, the theory could help provide
an explanation for an efficiency gap, but only under the conditions presented in the theory. To
the extent that public university managers are less likely than their private university
counterparts to believe they can improve their performance in attempting to increase efficiency,
to believe that their increased performance will lead to improved efficiency, or to believe that
they will in some way be rewarded for their efforts if they are able to improve efficiency, then
expectancy theory can help explain differences in efficiency. This is only true to the extent to
which there are differences between public university managers and private university managers.
If neither group believes they can influence efficiency, or both groups are equally convinced that
they can improve efficiency, then the theory does not provide much insight into efficiency
differences.
A final potential theoretical framework to help explain differences in efficiency between
public and private producers is budget maximizing theory. Like X-Inefficiency, budget
maximizing theory comes from economics. Specifically, this theory developed in the sub-field
of public choice economics. Budget maximizing theory holds that public sector managers do not
simply lack an incentive to be efficient, they are in fact incented to be inefficient in production.
This incentive occurs because the budgeting model for governments is often based on
consumption of the previous year’s budget (Niskanen 1971). This creates an incentive for public
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sector managers to utilize all their budgeted resources in any given year to increase their
likelihood of receiving additional resources in future years, regardless of whether using those
budgetary resources in the current year results in additional output.
If public university managers are attempting to maximize their current resource usage to
maximize available resource in future years, one would expect that they will behave in ways that
are less efficient than private university managers. This would only be true in the instance that
public university managers do, in fact, have their budgets set based on previous budgets, and that
private university managers do not, or at least the influence of the previous year’s budget on the
current year’s budget for private university managers is less than that of the public university
managers.
Figure 2 displays a general, combined model of the impacts of publicness on efficiency
drawing from X-Inefficiency, expectancy theory, and budget-maximizing theory.
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Figure 2: Model of Publicness and Efficiency

The present research will subject the hypotheses contained in the model to testing. Stage
one will test hypotheses one, two, and three and stage two will examine hypotheses four through
seven.
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H1:

The more publicness a university exhibits, the less efficient the university will be
with respect to producing postsecondary education.

H2:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through
competition for students. Managers at public universities will perceive less
competition for students than will managers at private universities.

H3:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through
competition for students. The more competition a university faces for students,
the more efficient the university will be.

H4:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through
personal motivation for efficiency. Managers at public universities will be less
motivated to make the university operate more efficiently than will be managers
at private universities.

H5:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through
personal motivation for efficiency. The more managers are motivated to increase
efficiency, the more efficient the university will be.

H6:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency. Managers at public universities will
perceive more bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency than will managers at
private universities.

H7:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency. The more managers perceive
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency, the less efficient the university will be.
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III METHODOLOGY
III.1 Overview
This is a two-part study designed to answer two related research questions embedded in
the model depicted in Figure 2. The first research question is, are private national universities in
the United States more efficient than public national universities at producing postsecondary
education? The second research question is, which, if any, theories help explain differences in
efficiency? The answers to these questions will help researchers better understand the dynamics
and boundary conditions of efficiency theories in the higher education setting, with implications
for the broader economy. Answering these questions will also help managers in public
universities understand how they may be able to increase efficiency in practice.
III.2 Stage One
III.2.1 Definition of Measures
The dependent variable under consideration is efficiency. Recall that efficiency measures
input per output. The measure for efficiency in this research is Total Core Expenses per Award.
As constructed, this measure is actually an indicator of inefficiency. As core expenses per award
increase, the university is expending more per degree, and therefor can be thought of as
operating in a less efficient (or more inefficient) manner.
Information was gathered from the National Center for Educational Statistics within the
U.S. Department of Education. This agency maintains the Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS), which houses a wide range of cost and performance data for colleges and
universities in the United States populated from self-reported information provided by
postsecondary educational institutions in response to surveys (IPEDS 2017).
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Total Core Expenses are the input portion of the efficiency measure. Guidance from the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and Governmental Accounting Standards Board
(GASB) governs the calculation and presentation of total core expenses. Core expenses include,
and are reported individually for, instruction, research, public service, academic support, student
services, institutional support, and other. Core expenses specifically exclude expenses for
auxiliary services such as bookstores, dormitories, hospitals, and other independent operations.
Awards represent one form of postsecondary education output. Awards are degrees
conferred upon students for completion of academic courses of study. The measure used for
awards in this research is the total number of awards issued by schools as reported to IPEDS
from July 1, 2015 through July 30, 2016. The total awards data are aggregated from several
smaller, discrete categories of awards including certificates, associates degrees, bachelor’s
degrees, master's degrees, and various types of doctoral degrees awarded.
The independent variable under consideration is the publicness of national universities.
The definition of national universities comes from U.S. News and World Report, an organization
that routinely provides information to the public on a variety of university performance and cost
metrics. National universities in this context “offer a full range of undergraduate majors, plus
masters and doctoral programs, and emphasize faculty research” (Morse et al 2016). National
universities are distinct from other types of universities, such as national liberal arts colleges,
which focus on undergraduate education and award significant numbers of arts and science
degrees. U.S. News and World Report also provides information on regional universities, which
offer few or no doctoral programs, and on regional colleges, which focus on undergraduate
education or associate degrees.
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There are different ways to define the publicness of national universities. U.S. News and
World Report, the federal government, and the public use a binary distinction between public
and private. Typically, the distinction is based upon whether publicly elected or appointed
individuals control and operate the university, as well as the source for most of the national
university’s funding. There is a further subdivision of private national universities into private
non-profit and private for profit, but private for profit national universities represent less than 3%
of all national universities, and they do not report meaningful performance and cost metrics, so
the study excludes them. The binary nature of the distinction between public national
universities and private national universities oversimplifies the concept of publicness. This
research uses the binary distinction of publicness as an independent variable, but also employs an
alternate construction.
Additional information from the federal IPEDS database related to federal, state, and
local appropriations and operating grants as a percentage of overall national university operating
revenue creates a more robust measure for publicness. This creates a continuous index that
serves as a proxy for the degree of publicness of a university. The greater the proportion of
governmental revenues to overall operating revenues, the larger is the value for the publicness
index. A similar measure for publicness was used by Sav (2012).
Stage one also tested the mediating variable of competition. Competition is the rate at
which the university rejects applications for admission as measured by the number of
applications and the number of admissions for the fall 2016 semester reported by universities to
the IPEDS database. This measure of competition was selected as it is the most readily available
data on competition between universities. Conceptually, other measures for competition could
include geographic characteristics such as the number of competing national universities within
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the state, or within a given area. The measure used here is broader in the sense that it accounts
for the fact that students can be mobile, and may apply to, be accepted to, and attend a university
that is geographically distant from their home.
Differences in efficiency between public national universities and private national
universities may appear for reasons other than the publicness of the university. For this reason,
the analysis must implement some statistical controls to limit the impacts of confounding factors
which may also be influencing efficiency. The confounding factor most likely to influence
measures of efficiency is quality. The production of high quality goods and services typically
requires higher quality, costlier inputs. It is difficult to measure the quality of educational
output, unlike other economic output such as iron or tobacco. Therefore, measuring and
controlling for the influence of quality on educational outputs is both important and difficult.
Measuring perceived quality from the viewpoint of the students for which universities
compete provides a logical point from which to begin. If prospective college students and their
families perceive that a university is of higher quality, they may be willing to tolerate a lower
level of efficiency from that university in exchange for receiving what they perceive as higher
quality output. Higher quality output could mean that the educational experience leads to more
certainty in terms of job placement after graduation, to a higher starting salary, to a greater or
deeper understanding of their area of study, or any other subjective or objective criteria which
the student values.
Adopting this definition of quality, one broad measure that is available as a proxy comes
from U.S. News and World Report. This organization has, since 1983, annually published
several lists and rankings that are available for use by prospective college students and their
families. The rankings contain summary and detailed information about several institutional
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characteristics of both public and private universities in a format that is readily assessable,
searchable, and understandable to the public. Criticisms of such rankings appear from several
sources, including from students, academia, and the government. Critics point out that such
comparisons are subjective and downplay important distinctions between universities that can be
predictors of success in postsecondary education. Despite these criticisms, many of which are
valid, there is evidence that some students consider these rankings “very important,” when
making decisions about which university to attend. This is especially true for students from
higher income families and those attending highly selective universities (Espinosa et al 2014).
U.S. News and World Report scores national universities on a ranking system from zero
to 100. The score consists of a combination of metrics around graduation and retention rates as
reported by universities (22.5%), undergraduate academic reputation as judged by peer
universities and high school guidance counselors (22.5%), faculty resources as measured by class
size and faculty salary (20%), student selectivity as measured by acceptance rates and ACT
scores of entering students (12.5%), financial resources as measured by per student spending
(10%), graduation rate performance which measures graduation rates experienced in excess of
graduation rates predicted by spending (7.5%), and alumni giving rate as reported by the
universities (5%) (Morse et al 2016).
As previously mentioned, the U.S. News and World Report rankings are not
without critics. Some of the constituent components of the U.S. News and World Report scores
are available individually from the IPEDS database. Additionally, there are other data available
in IPEDS which serve as proxies for either the quality of incoming students or the quality of the
university itself. These measures can be used individually, or collectively, as an alternative
quality control in lieu of the U.S. News and World Report scores. This alternative quality
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control measure does not have the subjective undergraduate reputation component, which
provides additional assurance in the objective, unbiased robustness of the quality control.
Table 1 summarizes the measures used in stage one of the research.
Table 1: Stage One Measures
Type
Measures

Construction

Values

Source Data
Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.

Inefficiency

Dependent
Variable

Total Core Expenditures
divided by Total Awards

Positive
values

Publicness

Independent
Variable

0% to
100%

Competition

Mediating
Variable

Quality (Index)

Primary
Control

Quality
(Enrollment)

Alternate
Control

Governmental
appropriations and
operating grants divided by
total operating revenues
Fall 2016 rejection rate of
applications for admission
to the university
Graduation retention rate,
Undergraduate Academic
Reputation, Faculty
Resources, Student
Selectivity, Financial
Resources, Graduation rate
performance, Alumni giving
rate
Total enrollment reported
for the Fall 2016 semester

Quality (ACT)

Alternate
Control

0 to 36

Quality
(Indebtedness)

Alternate
Control

Quality
(Scholarship)

Alternate
Control

Average ACT score for the
incoming freshman Fall
2016 admitted class
Average cumulative student
debt load of students
graduating in 2016
Average undergraduate
needs-based scholarship

Quality (Faculty
Ratio)

Alternate
Control

Inverse of student to faculty
ratio for 2016

0 to 1

Quality
(Graduation
Rate)

Alternate
Control

Four-year graduation rate

0% to
100%

0% to
100%
0 to 100

Positive
values

Positive
values
Positive
values

Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
Data for 2018
from U.S. News
and World
Report.

Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.
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Quality
(Freshman
Retention)

Alternate
Control

Quality (Tuition) Alternate
Control

Percentage of returning
freshman enrolled at the
beginning of their
sophomore year
Weighted average for instate and out-of-state tuition
for all students

0% to
100%

Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.

Positive
values

Data for 2016
from IPEDS
federal database.

Publicness is the percentage of university operating revenues in 2015 derived from
federal, state, and local government contracts or appropriations. The source of data for the
measure is the IPEDS federal database.
Inefficiency is total core expenditures per award. The source of data for the measure is
the IPEDS federal database.
Competition is the total number of rejected applications in the fall of 2016 divided by the
total number of applications.
Quality is a subjective score from zero to 100, based upon graduation rates,
undergraduate academic reputation, faculty resources, student selectivity, financial resources,
graduation rates, and alumni giving rates. The source of data for the measure is the 2018 U.S.
News and World Report College and University rankings.
Constituent parts of the overall quality score provided by U.S. News and World Report,
and other factors, may serve as additional controls.
Appendix A contains a full list of all 230 public and private national universities, as well
as their measures for efficiency, publicness, and quality.
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III.2.2 Data Analysis
III.2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
The first step in analyzing the secondary data is to understand the descriptive statistics
that summarize the variables under consideration. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the
secondary data collected as segregated by the binary definition of public and private universities.
With respect to efficiency, it is apparent that private universities expend more dollars per
award granted. Private universities expend an average of $197,097 per award, whereas public
universities expend an average of $146,977 per award. That means that on average, private
universities are spending roughly one third more per degree awarded than are public universities.
The variation in efficiency, however, is much greater within private universities as
compared to public universities. The range of efficiency for private universities is over
$1,000,000 per degree awarded, whereas the range for public universities is closer to $350,000
per degree. The standard deviation of efficiency for private universities is over $186,000,
whereas it is only $61,000 for public universities. Even accounting for the higher mean of
private university efficiency, the coefficient of variation for private universities is nearly 95%,
but only 42% for public universities.
With respect to the publicness of universities, public universities on average receive a
considerably larger share of their operating revenues from government sources than do private
universities. For public universities, the average is almost 44% of revenues coming from state
sources, whereas private universities operate on roughly only 11% of state funds. However,
there are some private universities that receive more than half of their revenues from government
sources whereas some public universities receive as little as 14% of revenues from governments.
This illustrates the blurring of the traditional definitions of public universities, especially as
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public universities have recently experienced reductions to their state appropriations in the face
of austere fiscal conditions.
With respect to competition, there is a good deal of overlap in the range over which
private and public universities reject candidates for admission. Private universities reject just
over 54% of applications for admission. Public universities only turn away 35% of their
applicants. The respective standard deviations of 25% for private universities and 17% for
public universities indicate that the variation of competition among the two types of universities
are similar. However, the most selective private universities reject 95% of applicants and the
most selective public universities turn away 84% of applicants. This is an indication that there
may be some divergence between the two types of universities at the more selective end of the
spectrum.
With respect to the U.S. News and World Report quality index, private universities on
average score more than 13 points higher on a 100-point scale than do public universities. The
average score for private universities was 58, and the average score for public universities was
almost 45. This means that private universities, on average, scored almost 30% better on the
quality index than did their public counterparts. This closely mirrors the 34% better that public
universities did with respect to efficiency.
Returning to the quality index, the maximum score for private universities matched the
maximum possible score of 100 points. The maximum score for public universities was 78, a
full 22 points lower. When ranking all 230 universities by this quality index, the first 21
universities are private in the binary sense of that term. As with the competition measure, the
wide disparity in the maximum score for the quality index indicates divergence of public and
private universities at the high end of the quality index scale.
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That is borne out by the alternate indicators of quality. Private universities enroll
students with higher average ACT scores, place those students in classes with more faculty
members per student, retain a greater percentage of those students from their freshman into their
sophomore year, and ultimately graduate a much higher percentage of those students in the
traditional four-year time frame.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Private Universities

Public Universities

III.2.2.2 Pearson Correlations
The next step of the analysis is to examine the relationships between different variables.
Bivariate correlation analysis was performed using Pearson’s correlation coefficient (Wilcox
2009). This measures the strength of relationships between variables one at a time, without
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controlling for the influence of other variables in the analysis. The formula for obtaining a
Pearson correlation coefficient is given below:

where
x and y are individual observations of the variables within a sample
x̅ and y̅ are the sample means of the variables
Correlation coefficients measure the strength of relationships between two variables on a
scale from negative one to one. A score of zero indicates that the values for the two variables do
not move together in any meaningful way, therefore knowing the value of one does not help
predict the value for the other. A score of one indicates a perfectly correlated or predictive
relationship, where 100% of the variation in one variable is associated with variation in the other
variable. Conversely, a score of negative one indicates a perfectly inverse correlation or
predictive relationship, where 100% of the variation in one variable is associated with variation
in the opposite direction of the other variable.
Correlation coefficients, like other inferential statistics, attempt to infer some
characteristic about the population under examination based on the analysis of one or more
samples of that population. When using a sample to make inferences about a population, there is
always the possibility that the result produced by the analysis of the sample will not truly reflect
the actual relationship in the population. To measure this likelihood, the result is subjected to a
test of statistical significance. Statistical significance in this context means that the chance that
the correlation coefficient from the sample would appear because of random chance, and not
because of a true relationship in the population, is less than 1%. Stated differently, if one
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continually drew samples of U.S. national universities and performed these analyses on them,
only in one out of every 100 instances would you calculate a correlation coefficient of the given
magnitude without such a relationship existing in the underlying population (Wilcox 2009).
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for several key variables. Focusing
first on the dependent variable of efficiency, there are three statistically significant individual
correlations with other variables.
Efficiency has a correlation coefficient of 0.586 with respect to competition. Using
Cohen’s (1988) thresholds for effect sizes, as modified by Rosenthal (1996), the individual
relationship between efficiency and competition is considered large. A large positive correlation
indicates that efficiency and competition largely move together in the same direction. Recall that
efficiency is measured as dollars per degree awarded, so larger values actually indicate less
efficient universities. It makes intuitive sense that highly competitive universities would be less
efficient, but as with all correlations we must be cautious not to interpret causality. There is
nothing in the data that indicates that because a university is competitive that it is less efficient,
or that because a university is less efficient it is competitive. The large correlation coefficient
only means that these measures move together.
Efficiency is also correlated individually with the U.S. News and World Report quality
score index. The correlation coefficient of 0.680 is even stronger than the relationship between
efficiency and competition. The magnitude here is just shy of the "very strong," category.
Again, this makes intuitive sense. High quality universities are likely to experience larger
expenditures to attract and retain high quality faculty, which would be associated with higher
costs per degree awarded.
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Efficiency is negatively correlated with the binary measure for publicness with a small
magnitude coefficient of -0.188. This means that lower costs per degree awarded are associated
with higher levels of publicness. The coding for the binary definition of publicness is a value of
zero for private universities, and a value of one for public universities. The negative correlation
indicates that public universities are associated with lower core expenditures per award than are
private universities. Recall, however, that this is a bivariate correlation analysis, and so the
relationship between the two is not taking into consideration other variables. That analysis will
come later.
With respect to the continuous variable for publicness, there are statistically significant
correlations with competition, and quality. Publicness has a small negative correlation of -0.171
with competition when measured continuously, and a medium negative correlation of -0.411
when measured in the binary sense. This is an indication that public universities are associated
with fewer rejections of applications for admission than are private universities. Anecdotally,
many are familiar with stories of elite private universities where admission is very competitive,
but these correlation coefficients take into account the relationship between publicness and
competition for all universities studied. The data include some highly selective public
institutions like the Universities of Virginia and Michigan, as well as less selective private
universities.
Publicness also has a small negative correlation of -0.199 with quality as measured by the
U.S. News and World Report score index when publicness is measured continuously, and a
medium negative correlation with quality of -0.363 when publicness is measured in the binary
sense. This is an indication that public universities are associated with lower levels of quality
scores on this index than are private universities.
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Finally, the strongest correlation is between quality and competition. The correlation
coefficient there of 0.813 falls comfortably within the "very large," range. This is even larger
than correlation between the two definitions of publicness (0.809), which we would expect to be
the largest in the set because both definitions purport to measure the same underlying concept.
Part of the strength of this correlation is explained by the fact that the quality index contains a
component which measures competition. Even with this partial explanation, the relationship is
still very strong. This is evidence that much of the variation in the competitiveness of admission
to a university is associated with variations in the quality of the university. When this correlation
is combined with the correlations between publicness and quality and between publicness and
competition discussed above, there is some indication that public and private universities may be
competing for different students. If public universities are associated with lower quality scores,
and public universities are associated with lower competition for admission, and lower quality
scores are very strongly associated with less competition for admission, it may be the case that
public and private universities are competing for different sets of students.
Again, all of the correlation coefficients discussed only suggest that variables move
together, and further only suggest that one variable moves with one other variable. The "chainlogic," used in the preceding paragraph to introduce the notion that public and private
universities are competing for different students cannot be fully supported with correlation
analysis because each relationship described at each step of the analysis pertains only to the
relationship between two variables. To simultaneously account for changes in multiple
variables, we need to move from correlation analysis to regression and structural equation
modeling.
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Table 3: Bivariate Pearson Correlations

III.2.2.3 Structural Equation Modeling and Regression
The final analysis for stage one involves structural equation modeling. Structural
equation modeling is a form of statistical analysis designed to perform regression analysis on
several latent variables simultaneously (Hair 2014) (Hair Ringle & Sarstedt 2011) (Hancock &
Mueller 2013). Linear regression is a statistical method of analysis by which the impact of one
variable, the independent or explanatory variable, is measured on another, the dependent or
explained variable. The advantage of linear regression over correlation analysis is that linear
regression allows for the analysis of the impact of the explanatory variable on the explained
variable, while holding constant the values of other variables which may also influence the
explained variable. Unlike correlation analysis, linear regression allows the influences of
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multiple explanatory variables to be tested on a single explained variable simultaneously such
that the effect of each explanatory variable can be ascertained individually.
Linear regression simultaneously estimates the relationships between one or more
explanatory variables and a single explained variable by minimizing the sum of the squared
variances between the individual observations of each variable and the estimated line that best
fits the data. The most general form of the regression equation is given as:

y = α + βx + ε
where
y is the dependent variable
α is the intercept
β is the slope
x is the independent variable
ε is the error term
In the regression equation, beta estimates the impact that each independent variable has
on the dependent variable. Unstandardized betas are presented in the units of measure for the
original variables and indicate how much change a one unit increase in the independent variable
changes the dependent variable. When the betas are standardized such that they are presented in
terms of standard deviations, they can be interpreted much like correlation coefficients.
Standardized betas estimate the relative explanatory strength of each independent variable on the
dependent variable (Freedman 2009).
Structural equation modeling takes the advantage of linear regression over correlation
one step further. In linear regression, the influence of multiple explanatory variables can be
tested on a single explained variable. In structural equation modeling, multiple explanatory
variables can be tested on multiple explained variables. Variables in structural equation
modeling can act as both explanatory as well as explained latent variables.
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Four structural equation models were performed. Two models used the binary definition
of public as the independent variable, and two used the continuous definition. Two models used
the U.S. News and World Report quality score as a control for quality, and two models used
several constituent indicators of quality as controls. Model 3, which uses the continuous
measure of publicness and the U.S. News and World Report score as the quality control, is the
preferred model. Model 3 is preferred because it has a continuous rather than binary independent
variable, and because there is no multicollinearity amongst multiple indicators for quality. The
other models are presented to demonstrate that the results hold under alternate definitions of
publicness with alternate controls for quality. The estimated standardized betas are summarized
in Table 4. The results of all four models are contained in APPENDICES C-F.
The results of these models support several conclusions about the comparative efficiency
of public and private sector provision of postsecondary education in U.S national universities.
III.2.2.3.1 Hypothesis 1
With respect to hypothesis one, that public universities are less efficient than private
universities, the model shows a positive relationship between the publicness of a university and
the university’s core expenses per award. That is, as a university becomes more public, it
expends more dollars per award granted than its private counterparts (becomes less efficient),
even after controlling for differences in quality. Again, using Cohen’s (1988) thresholds for
effect sizes, as modified by Rosenthal (1996), the estimated standardized beta of .232 in the
primary model is considered a small effect. The effect is statistically significant in all models,
although the magnitude of the effect size varies across models.
Standardized betas represent strengths of relationships, but there is also meaning attached
to unstandardized betas. Unstandardized betas are the estimated slopes in the regression
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equation presented in Section III.1.2.2.3. Since unstandardized betas are presented in the
original units for the variables they pertain to, they can be used to predict values for the
dependent variable given values for the independent variables.
As an example, running a standard ordinary least squares regression analysis on the
secondary data with efficiency as the dependent variable and with the continuous measure of
publicness, competition, and quality as the explanatory variables yields the following regression
equation:
y = -$140,129 + ($1,535)*(Publicness) + ($629)*(Competition) + ($4,688)*(Quality)
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the unstandardized beta estimate for
competition of $629 is not statistically significant at 95%. For a full report of the regression
analysis, please see APPENDIX G.
One method for interpreting and testing estimates produced by a regression analysis is to
use the estimated regression equation to estimate a data point that is already in the sample used
to construct the regression. If I substitute the average values for public universities in the
estimated regression equation, I find:

y = -$140,129 + ($1,535)*(43.7) + ($629)*(35.4) + ($4,668)*(44.8)
or
y = $158,374 per degree awarded
The actual average efficiency of the public universities in the sample was $146,977. The
regression equation over-estimated the parameter by $8,788, or roughly 7.75%.
Similarly, if I substitute the average values for a private university from the descriptive
statistics, I find:
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y = -$140,129 + ($1,535)*(11) + ($629)*(54.4) + ($4,668)*(58.1)
or
y = $182,218 per degree awarded
The actual average efficiency of the private universities in the sample was $197,097. The
regression equation under-estimated the parameter by $14,879, or roughly 7.55%.
The estimated regression equation can be used to predict values for the dependent
variable given any set of values for the independent variables. With respect to hypothesis one,
the correct interpretation for the unstandardized beta is, "For each additional percentage point of
operating revenues that a university receives from government sources, their operating cost per
degree awarded will increase by $1,535, controlling for the influence of competition and
quality."
III.2.2.3.2 Hypothesis 2
With respect to hypothesis two, which predicts that public universities will experience
less competition for students than private universities, there is mixed support for the mediating
influence of competition between publicness and efficiency. The primary model shows a very
weak negative effect of -0.10, but the estimated effect is not statistically significant. The first
model also shows a weak negative effect, and the effect there is statistically significant.
However, models 2 and 4, which use the constituent controls for quality, both show a weak
positive effect, one of which is significant and the other of which is not. There is not sufficient
evidence in the data to conclude that public universities face less competition for students than
private universities.
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To evaluate the unstandardized beta, I estimate a new regression equation where
competition is the dependent variable rather than efficiency, and the independent variables are
the continuous measure for publicness and quality. This yields the estimated regression
equation:

y = -8.04% - (.01%)*(Publicness) + (1.03%)*(Quality)

Again, it is worth noting before continuing that the estimated unstandardized beta for
publicness is not statistically significant at 95%. This is evidence to conclude that the data do
not support the hypothesis that publicness contributes to competition. Full results of the
regression analysis are found in APPENDIX H.
Notwithstanding the fact that the regression equation yields a non-statistically significant
coefficient for publicness, we continue the interpretation by substituting the average values for
public universities, and find:

y = -8.04% - (.01%)*(43.7) + (1.03%)*(44.8)
or
y = 37.4% rejection rate
The actual average level of competition for public universities in the sample, as measured
by the application rejection rate, was 35.4%. The regression equation over-estimated the
parameter by 2%, or roughly 5.6% of the actual value.
Similarly, if I substitute the average values for a private university from the descriptive
statistics, I find:
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y = -8.04% - (.01%)*(11) + (1.03%)*(58.1)
or
y = 51.5% rejection rate
The actual average level of competition for private universities in the sample, as
measured by the application rejection rate, was 54.4%. The regression equation over-estimated
the parameter by 3%, or roughly 5% of the actual value.
III.2.2.3.3 Hypothesis 3
With respect to H3, which predicts that universities which experience more competition
for students will be more efficient, there is again mixed support for the mediating influence of
competition between publicness and efficiency. The primary model shows a small effect of .106,
and the estimated effect is statistically significant. The first model also shows a small,
statistically significant effect (.128), but the second (-.067) and fourth (.136) models indicate
small negative effects, one of which is statistically significant. There is not sufficient evidence
in the data to conclude that public universities face less competition for students than private
universities.
Regarding the unstandardized betas, we can use the same regression equation used for
hypothesis one and interpret those results. Recall that the coefficient for competition in that
estimated regression equation was not statistically significant at 95%. This is evidence that the
data do not support the hypothesis that competition affects efficiency.
III.2.2.3.4 Other Findings
There are also several other interesting findings that result from stage one which were not
part of the original set of hypotheses. For example, the primary model shows a small negative
effect of publicness on quality (-.199). The other models provide similar support with different
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effect sizes, and all are statistically significant. This is an indication that public schools are of
lower “quality,” and that holds true for both measures of quality and both measures of
publicness. Coupled with the finding that there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that
public schools face less competition for students, this evidence suggests that public and private
universities are perhaps competing in two different spheres for two different populations of
students.
This notion is further supported by an additional finding, which is that the quality of the
university has a very large effect on the level of competition. The primary model shows an
effect size of .813 between quality and competition. That effect, and the large effect size, are
reproduced in the other three models, and the effect size is even larger than the control in place
between quality and efficiency (.640). Quality goes a long way in explaining how much
competition there is to attend a university, and the publicness of the university affects quality.
The evidence thus far indicates that there is an inverse relationship between the
publicness of a U.S. national university and the efficiency with which the university delivers
postsecondary education. The relationship does not appear to be mediated through competition.
The model does indicate that there may be other mediating variables between publicness and
efficiency. To explore the mediating influence of personal motivation of efficiency and
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency, we turn our attention to stage two and the collection and
analysis of qualitative data.
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Table 4: Structural Equation Modeling Results

Test H1

#

Independent/Control

Test H2

Test H3

Publicness Publicness
Competition
Publicness
to
to
Quality to Quality to
to
to Quality Efficiency Competition Competition Efficiency Efficiency

1

Binary/Index

-0.363**

0.085*

-0.133**

0.765**

0.607**

0.128**

2

Binary/Constituent

-0.652**

0.527**

0.172**

0.907**

1.139**

-0.067

3

Continuous/Index

-0.199**

0.232**

-0.010

0.811**

0.640**

0.106*

4

Continuous/Constituent -0.224*

0.282**

0.011

0.813**

0.977**

-0.136*

* Significant at 95%
**Significant at 99%
III.3 Stage Two
Having performed statistical analysis on secondary data to provide evidence of a
relationship between the publicness of a university and the efficiency of the university, I now
turn to the question of why that might be the case. The analysis in stage one did not support the
hypothesis that competition played a mediating role between the publicness of a university and
the efficiency with which the university conferred degrees. The model proposed in Figure 2
contemplates two other possible sources of mediation for the relationship in accordance with
expectancy theory and budget-maximizing theory.
The data required to test the mediating influence of personal motivations and budgeting
models are not currently collected and reported in any meaningful way. There is some scattered
information available on university websites and in financial statements related to the budgeting
process, but the data is very spotty and not useable for any statistical analysis. Data on the
personal motivations of university administrators are even scarcer, as by definition the
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motivation for individual administrators is unique to the administrator and does not exist in any
meaningful way at the university level.
III.3.1 Primary Data Collection
To collect the data necessary to better understand the mediating impacts of personal
motivation and budgeting processes, a series of semi-structured depth interviews was performed
with administrators and faculty at both public and private universities. Semi-structured depth
interviews allow the investigator to guide an information gathering discussion with the subject,
while allowing the subject freedom to give rich, meaningful insights into the matter under
investigation (Strauss 1987).
A total of ten interviews were conducted in February and March of 2018, both face-toface and over the telephone. Audio of the interviews was recorded, and the audio file was used
to create a written transcript of the interview. The written interview transcripts then became the
artifacts which were the basis of qualitative analysis.
Universities were chosen at random from the list of 230 universities examined in stage
one. Contact was made via e-mail and by telephone with a point of contact listed on publicly
available websites for offices of institutional research. After briefly explaining the research to
the instructional research point of contact, the investigator asked for the name of a potential
interview subject. The only conditions imposed for participation were that subject had to be
willing to be interviewed, and that they had familiarity with the university budgeting process.
The ten subjects that agreed to participate were subjected to a semi-structured interview
consisting of six questions, with appropriate follow-up questions or re-directions as needed.
Before the interviews began, the investigator gave a brief introduction to the research, including
the definition for the term "efficiency." The questions encouraged subjects to discuss the relative
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importance of efficiency at their university, the incentives in place and personal motivations to
be efficient, the influence of the budgeting process on efficiency, and the views of the
administrator on non-traditional academic calendars and non-traditional methods of course
delivery, such as online learning, in terms of both their impacts on efficiency and the quality of
education provided. The complete interview guide used can be found in Appendix B.
III.3.2 Data Analysis
III.3.2.1 Data Description
To encourage honest and forthright discussions during the interviews, subjects were
assured that personally identifiable information would not be included in the research. However,
it is possible to provide some general overview of the interview data collected to provide context
for its analysis. Ideally, interviews would be conducted with university presidents or provosts to
provide the broadest possible view of university budgeting, and to ascertain the personal
motivations of individuals at the highest levels of the university administration with ostensibly
the most ability to influence such a broad measure as university efficiency. Practically, these
individuals have enormous demands on their time, and are therefore difficult to gain access to.
To partially overcome this inability to collect data from the highest levels of university
administrators, the investigator interviewed a broad sample of university personnel to gain
perspectives from different areas of university life.
The interview subjects had experience in several different areas of the university
including research, student aid, registration, institutional effectiveness, and academic program
management. Their experiences covered a broad range of university activities, including
assisting students, interacting with the federal government, general university administration,
academic program creation and management. None of the subjects listed their primary
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responsibility as teaching, although three of the public university subjects and four of the private
university subjects were either actively teaching courses or had taught courses within the past
two academic years.
Three interview subjects had worked at both public and private universities and were able
to provide comparative and contrasting points of view for each type of institution. Most subjects
had been in academia their entire professional career, and the average time at the current
institution was 12 years. Only one subject described himself as being in the early stage of his
career, most considered themselves in mid-career, and two subjects mentioned decisions or
impending decisions to retire within the next five years.
III.3.2.2 Word Cloud Analysis
Using online tools to perform world cloud analysis has been recognized as a useful
supplement to more traditional methods of qualitative analysis (McNaught and Lam 2010).
Word cloud analysis involves transforming textual interview data into graphic form. The size of
words and phrases that appear in the graphic represent the relative frequency with which the
words or phrases occurred in the interview transcript. This provides a visual overview of the
words spoken most frequently by the interview subjects, which may be thought of as a proxy for
the relative importance they place on the concepts.
Creating meaningful word clouds requires some data cleansing. The author removed
common verbal ticks such as “um,” “uh,” “like,” “so,” and “you know” from the analysis. Also,
some basic transformations were made to combine like words and phrases such as “student” and
“students” and “efficiency” and “efficient.”
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Figures 3 shows the word cloud resulting from the combination of all private university
subject interview transcripts, and Figure 4 shows the world cloud from all public university
subject interviews.
The most striking similarity between the two clouds is that the largest, and therefore most
frequently occurring word in both, is “students.” Subjects from both private and public
universities discussed the concept of efficiency from a student-centric perspective. The subjects
were not familiar with speaking of efficiency in terms of how the university was using its
resources; instead they were thinking in terms of the time and effort students were expending to
obtain their degrees. Four-year and six-year graduation rates, which are outcome measures, were
discussed as measures of efficiency for moving students through the university system. This was
especially true at public universities, where the degree to which “students” was the most frequent
word was even greater than its relative frequency in private university interviews.
Perhaps more interesting than the similarities are the differences in the word clouds. For
example, the word “state” appears with some regularity in the public university interviews, but
not at all in the private university interviews. The words “research,” "budget,” and “tuition”
appear more frequently in public university interviews. For the private university interviews,
terms related to the structure of the universities like “model” and “mission" are more prevalent.
Importantly, the relative importance of terms that indicate size were very different between the
two types of universities. Subjects at private universities were more likely to use terms like
“small,” and “little,” when discussing size, whereas the most prevalent size term in the public
university interviews was “big.”
The similarities and differences in word clouds are brought into even sharper relief by
comparing the ten most frequently used terms from each cloud. For private university subjects,

46
the ten most frequently used words were “students,” “faculty,” “efficiency,” “years,” “college,”
“going,” “really,” “money,” “mission,” and “model.” For public university subjects, the ten
most frequently used words were, “students,” “university,” “going,” “get,” “efficiency,”
“money,” “budget,” “research,” “state,” and “really.”
The fact that private university subjects used the word “faculty” more frequently than
"efficiency," even though the questions coming from the interviewer used the term “efficiency,”
but not “faculty,” implies that the concept of faculty is very important to private university
subjects. Based on interviewer observation of content and tone, private university subjects most
often spoke of faculty in terms of resources that improved the experience for students, but acted
as a drain on, and were often openly hostile to, the concept of “efficiency.” That is why the term
“efficiency,” appeared next most frequently, and toward the end of the list the terms “mission,”
and “model," as in subjects describing that the mission of the university and model it used were,
by nature, not efficient.
Public university interview subjects spoke about efficiency as well, but even though the
term was included in their questions just as with private university subjects, the public subjects
only used it enough for the term to be the fifth most popular, as opposed to the third most
popular with private university subjects. This implies that the concept of efficiency, even during
an interview about efficiency, was just not as much on the forefront of the minds of public
university subjects.
Word cloud analysis can help with beginning to identify trends in qualitative data. Some
early patterns begin to emerge with respect to the views of university administrators in general,
but also some differences between the concepts that public and private university administrators
emphasize. All interview subjects were familiar with the concept of efficiency from the point of
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view of students, but not from the point of view of the university. Private university
administrators were more likely to talk about the mission of the university and the model of
education they used to achieve that mission, whereas public university administrators focused on
words indicating diverse missions like “research,” but also on terms related to revenue and
efficiency such as “tuition,” and “budget.”
To confirm these trends, and find further patterns in the data, I turn to a more established
and systematic tool for analyzing qualitative data.
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Figure 3: Private University Word Cloud
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Figure 4: Public University Word Cloud
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III.3.2.3 Matrix Analysis
Matrix analysis is another tool of qualitative analysis, which is useful for both coding and
analysis, but can be especially useful with respect to identifying themes and comparing themes
across subgroups (Ryan and Bernard 2003). Figures 5 and 6 contain matrices that extract themes
from the responses for private university subjects and public university subjects. The first
column corresponds to the topics introduced through the semi-structured interview questions.
The second column contains representative quotes from interview subjects about the topic, and
the third column indicates an overall pattern of the responses.
Comparing the responses for the importance of efficiency at the university between the
matrices gives insight into how administrators at each type of university view the topic at their
institution. Overall, subjects at private universities did not consider efficiency to be a topic that
their administrations discussed frequently or emphasized. There was some indication that the
concept of efficiency had been gaining popularity and interest over the recent past, while some
private university subjects expressed a clear opinion that efficiency in delivery of education was
almost antithetical to their business model.
On the other hand, public university administrators indicated that they heard the concept
of efficiency discussed relatively frequently. Public interview subjects were not able to articulate
precisely what the university goals were with respect to efficiency, but the topic did come up in
regular conversation. The views of efficiency were context specific, generally with faculty
members discussing the concept less frequently and with more disdain, but with higher level
administrators focusing more on the topic and seeming more interested in understanding the
metrics around efficiency.
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Regarding the use of efficiency metrics and measures of efficiency, both private and
public university interview subjects indicated that their universities collected or tracked at least
some information about efficiency. Neither type of university was interested in using their
efficiency metrics to attract potential students, in fact some of the private university subjects
again stated that marketing based on efficiency would be counter-productive from the standpoint
of their efforts to brand themselves as a “high touch” university. Public university administrators
did mention, without prompting or direct questioning by the interviewer, that efficiency metrics
can and were used for other purposes. Two public university subjects discussed in detail how
efficiency measures were used during discussions with the state legislature, and one mentioned
that the university president and members of the board of trustees were interested in efficiency
metrics.
Regarding the influence of budgeting on efficiency, the private university subjects did not
indicate that the budgeting process had a great deal of impact on efficiency. For the most part,
budgeting did seem to be based on previous year budgets, but several subjects indicated that
other factors played a role and the relationship between budgeting and efficiency was weak.
Public university administrators, on the hand, were clear that the budgeting process was a
disincentive to behaving efficiently. The term “use it or lose it,” was brought up more than once,
and one subject indicated employees would go on a “spending spree” as they approached the end
of a budget year. This problem was exacerbated by a lot of cross-subsidizing between budgetary
units in the form of indirect cost allocations to and from a central budgeting unit, to the point that
it was not clear what units were operating efficiently and which were not.
Public administrators did indicate that there had been a shift over the past ten years
toward a more de-centralized budgeting process, but in one instance the subject indicated that
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this was more of a cyclical change than a linear movement toward decentralization. At least one
public administrator also indicated that the university was moving toward a more “student
outcome-based budgeting model,” although the administrator was not clear on how student
outcomes were to be measured or how the budgeting shift would be implemented.
To understand the use of one possible tool to increase efficiency, the interviewer asked
private and public university subjects about their university’s adoption of non-traditional
academic calendars and/or non-traditional methods of course delivery such as online or distance
learning programs. The questioning centered around not only their use of non-traditional
instruction methods, but also their thoughts on whether the use of non-traditional course delivery
would constitute a degradation in the quality of the educational experience.
Private university subjects indicated, for the most part, that they had begun to adopt some
forms of non-traditional academic calendars such as more instruction during the summer, but by
and large they were resistant to online and distance learning. The private university subjects
expressed that online and distance learning did represent a lower level of educational quality than
in-person instruction, but more broadly they perceived resistance to online instruction at their
university as more “not a fit” for their model of instruction. Words like “tradition,” “model,”
and “our way of doing business,” were prevalent during these portions of the interviews.
Public university subjects expressed a much greater willingness to adopt both nontraditional academic calendars and especially non-traditional methods of course delivery. Two
public university subjects spoke of non-traditional course delivery almost as points of pride. One
subject indicated “We are really progressive,” in terms of delivering online and distance
learning, and another stated that “We have really leaned into that.” Public university subjects
also exhibited the sentiment that online course delivery could result in a loss of educational
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quality, but they were more nuanced in their reservations. Three public university subjects
indicated that the type of instruction was the key to whether the course could be delivered online
without a loss in quality. Subjects such as mathematics and chemistry which lend themselves to
a more lecture-style learning environment were thought to be good candidates for online
learning, whereas seminar or participation-based learning were thought to be poor candidates.
III.3.2.4 Other Qualitative Insights
Aside from the trends identified by the word cloud analysis and refined in the matrix
analysis, some additional patterns emerged from the interviews overall which were not directly
related to questions in the interview or to the concepts contained in the hypothesized model of
efficiency. Three main patterns emerged spontaneously throughout the interview process and
were common across both types of interview subjects.
First, as partially discussed earlier, interview subjects were not particularly familiar with
thinking of efficiency in terms of the university, as opposed to in terms of the student as they
moved through the university. When subjects began to think more deeply about efficiency from
the standpoint of the university, they began to make distinctions between the efficiency of the
university in terms of day-to-day operations, and the efficiency of the university with respect to
delivering education. Subjects agreed that concepts such as dining operations, building
maintenance, landscaping, and other operational aspects of the university were subject to
pressures for efficiency. The way in which the university was organized academically and the
way in which the university delivered education were thought to be outside the realm of
efficiency considerations. The subjects’ responses implied that attempting to apply efficiency to
the academic aspects of the university would be thought of as crude or counterproductive,
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whereas focusing on efficiency in daily operations was accepted and encouraged as part of being
good stewards of students’ tuition dollars.
Related to the first point, when discussing the efficiency of daily operations, two private
university subjects and three public university subjects used the term “sustainability” in lieu of
efficiency. All these subjects interpreted efforts at sustainability to be euphemisms for
operational efficiency but packaged in such a way as to be more attractive to outside
stakeholders. Subject eight told an entire story that lasted nearly four minutes about how the
university had saved several million dollars in landscaping and watering costs by changing to
hardscaping, but specifically did not emphasize the cost savings when discussing their “green
initiatives.” The same was true from subject three, who told a story about eliminating trays in
the cafeteria, forcing students to make multiple trips to carry all their food. The university
highlighted the fact that less soap and water were used since there was no longer a need to wash
trays but did not advertise the fact that students were now eating less because of the change, and
so food costs had gone down while the price of a meal plan had not. Again, the undercurrent of
the stories was that it was somehow distasteful to discuss efficiency for its own sake.
Finally, a stray pattern emerged concerning confusing the size of the university with the
publicness of a university. The beginning of this pattern was identified in the word cloud
analysis but was clearly touched upon by multiple subjects in their interviews even beyond the
extent of the relative size of the words in the word clouds. The subjects routinely used “small”
to mean “private,” and “large,” to mean “public.” This is best illustrated by an interaction with
subject three, who currently works at a large public university, but had previously worked at a
small, private liberal arts university. Proper nouns are redacted for privacy, and italics is added
for emphasis. Also, like most other subjects, subject three here assumes that my findings in
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stage one, which were discussed generally before the interview, had found public universities to
be more efficient than private ones.
Interviewer:

“You mentioned previously that you worked for a private university
before your current position. Can you tell me a little about how private
universities view efficiency differently than public universities?”

Subject 3:

“So, prior to (current university), I was at (previous university). I think
the smaller liberal arts schools tend not to do nearly as good a job as the
bigger state schools in terms of efficiency. They just do not measure or
care about it as much. It is not a concern of theirs.”

III.3.2.4.1 Hypothesis 1
Recall that there was evidence from stage one to support the hypothesis that private
universities are more efficient than public universities, but there was not sufficient evidence to
support hypotheses that this relationship was mediated through competition. The matrix analysis
in stage two provides some additional insight into why private universities may be more
efficient.
As discussed below under hypothesis six, the budgeting model of the university may be
playing a role. Beyond budgeting though, the concept of efficiency just did not seem to be at the
forefront of public university subjects' minds. This was also true of private university interview
subjects, but the concept was even more remote from the forefront for public university subjects
than for private university subjects.
When public university managers did begin to speak about efficiency, they often spoke
very narrowly about areas with which they were familiar. That was true even of the more senior
level public university subjects interviewed. Recall also that some interview subjects used the
terms "public" and "large" interchangeably, and "private" and "small" interchangeably. Finally,

56
recall that public university subjects discussed centralized budgeting and cross-subsidization of
units across campus.
Together, these points may help explain why private universities are more efficient than
public universities. It may be the case that public universities are so large, and unfocused on
efficiency, and so narrowly focused on budget units which are cross-subsidizing one another,
that they may be experiencing some diseconomies of scale. Rather than enjoying the benefits of
spreading fixed costs over a larger number of students, it may be the case that these universities
become so large and difficult to manage from an overall point of view, that individual units make
decisions that ultimately lead to less efficiency at the university level.
III.3.2.4.2 Hypothesis 4
There is not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that managers at public
universities are less motivated to act in efficient ways than are managers in private universities.
Neither public nor private university administrators could readily think of incentives that their
universities had put in place to increase efficiency. This question tended to bring the interviews
almost to a standstill. It took a good deal of mental effort for the subjects to understand what
was being asked, and even after providing examples of possible incentives that could be put in
place, almost no subject was able to come with an example at their university. Only one of the
ten subjects was finally able to offer that he had received an extra $100 in return for attending a
health screening, and that example took him nearly one minute to recall. Either universities are
not implementing incentives for efficient behavior, or if they are, they are doing an ineffective
job of communicating those efforts to employees.
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III.3.2.4.3 Hypothesis 5
The data do not provide evidence that managers who are more motivated to behave in
efficient ways increase the efficiency of their universities. There was little to no variation in the
level of motivation for personal efficiency, either as measured by university incentives in place,
or in terms of other general topics raised by interview subjects during the interviews. More
variation is needed in the level of personal motivation before meaningful conclusions may be
drawn concerning the impact of motivation on efficiency.
III.3.2.4.4 Hypothesis 6
There is evidence to support hypothesis six, which indicated that public university
managers would perceive more bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency. While private
university managers were somewhat ambiguous in their responses, public university managers
clearly signaled that centralized budgeting and a “use it or lose it,” mentality encouraged
officials to act in inefficient ways.
Perhaps more importantly though, the budgeting process was also revealed as a source of
masking which units were efficient and which were not based. Heavy use of indirect cost
allocations and centralized budgeting processes in public universities mean that it is difficult for
managers to grasp an overall view of efficiency, and to easily identify which units are efficient
and which are not.
While this same pattern may be true to a certain extent in private universities, it was not
mentioned by any private university interview subjects. This indicates that the pattern is either
not present, or possibly present but not as prevalent at private universities.
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III.3.2.4.5 Hypothesis 7
While there is no direct evidence to support the hypothesis that employees with less
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency will cause their universities to operate in a more
efficient manner, there is indirect evidence that indicates this is a likely mediator for the
relationship between publicness and efficiency. The evidence from hypothesis one indicates that
public universities are less efficient than private universities, and the evidence from hypothesis
six indicates that public university managers experience more bureaucratic motivation for
inefficiency. The combination of these sets of evidence suggest that bureaucratic motivation for
inefficiency is a prime candidate to help explain the relationship between publicness and
efficiency.
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Figure 5: Private University Matrix Analysis
Topic

Representative Private University Quotes

“I was the only one that really gave much thought to that sort of concept.” “I think it’s
Importance something we talk about a lot.” “I’d say it depends on the situation…on the
of
operational side it is very important…but on the academic side, not at all.” “We are
Efficiency thoughtful of how we use resources now, but ten years ago not at all.” “I would phrase
it as, we don’t worry about inefficiency, because it’s part of our business model.”
“We measure a lot.” “We do not directly market to students on efficiency, although we
do so indirectly.” “It does not help attract students.” “This is a high touch country
Use of
Efficiency club type of school, efficiency would not be something we would promote to students.
Their parents are driving the equivalent of two Lexus’ off a cliff each year to send them
Metrics
here.”

Private University Theme
Little to no emphasis on
efficiency, although there has
been increased focus there
over the past ten years.
Not used in marketing
material to attract potential
students.

“The budget matters, and it matters a great deal, but only on the operational side.”
“Budgets are largely based on what we spent last year.” “I have never worried about
the budget process, because we have the luxury of being able to fundraise almost at
will.”

The budget process does not
incentivize efficiency and
may work as a disincentive to
efficiency.

“There wasn’t anything direct.” “I know what you’re talking about, but that is not
something we have done that I’m aware of.” “We do not have an incentive structure
Incentives / like what you are talking about.”
Motivation

There are no formal or
informal incentives in place to
reward efficient behavior.

Impact of
Budget
Process

NonTraditional
Instruction

“We are a very traditional school.” “That is not what we do. We will not even accept
transfer credits from an online university.” “There is active resistance to that.” “We
have started to move ever so slightly toward more classes in the summer, but as to
online or distance learning, there has been no movement in that direction and I can’t
see it happening in the foreseeable future.”

Very little support for nontraditional academic
calendars, and no support for
non-traditional methods of
course delivery.
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Figure 6: Public University Matrix Analysis
Topic

Representative Public University Quotes

“I think it's something we talk about more. It has been more of a focus in recent years
Importance with budget cuts from the state.” “I think people do pay attention to it, but more at a
of
student level and it depends on who you are talking to.” “Faculty do not really pay
Efficiency attention, but for those in other roles it varies.” “I hear it discussed from time to time.”

Use of
Efficiency
Metrics

Impact of
Budget
Process

“You talk about efficiency, but that is also part of sustainability…that is good public
relations, so they are going to market that.” “Efficiency, no, I’ve never seen that in the
marketing materials…we market on student experience and football.” “We don’t
market it to students…but it would be something we would discuss with the
legislature.” “It would not be included in marketing…but would be used by
administration.”
“This is how much we spent last year, and we need to spend it because if we don’t,
we’ll get less next year.” “The budget model is changing to more of a focus on student
success.” “If the facilities people had money in the month of May, they would go on a
spending spree.” “It’s use it or lose it.” “More of the money, instead of being
centralized, is kind of doled out so there is a little bit more discretion among units.” “I
don’t know of any incentives to come in under budget.”

“If you participate in a health screening, they give you $100.” “I can’t think of any
specific examples.” I’ve worked at a few places that do that, not here, I can’t think of
Incentives / one.” “I don’t know of anything off the top of my head…there are resources like lean
Motivation six sigma for them to use, but no incentives.” “The answer is no, and the problem is
the accounting system makes it hard to tell how efficient you are.” “No, not that I’m
aware of.”
“We offer a lot of instruction at non-traditional times, and some online and distance
learning.” “I think we’re pretty progressive…we have an online college.” “Yes, we’re
Nonvery interested in that.” “We offer distance learning, although there is some debate as
Traditional to the quality of the educational experience.” “We have several online and distance
Instruction learning courses and programs.”

Public University Theme
The topic is discussed in
general terms, but it is very
context dependent.
Not used in marketing
material to attract potential
students, but useful for other
purposes.

There are some strong
disincentives to efficiency,
although that is changing or
somewhat mitigated through
shifts toward de-centralization
or outcome-based budgeting.
There are few or no incentives
in place to reward efficient
behavior.

Wide support for nontraditional calendars and nontraditional instruction, but not
at the expense of quality.
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IV DISCUSSION
IV.1 Conclusions
The model set forth in Figure 2 contained seven hypotheses. Using the combined
quantitative and qualitative analyses, I am now able to draw some conclusions regarding some of
those hypotheses.
H1:

The more publicness a university exhibits, the less efficient the university will be with
respect to producing postsecondary education.
Four structural equation models using both a binary and continuous measure for

publicness as well as an index and component-based controls for quality provide support at a
99% level of statistical significance that there is a relationship between publicness and
efficiency. Examining 230 national universities in the United States, the primary model
indicated a small effect size of 0.232 between publicness and efficiency. The direction of the
relationship was consistent with the hypothesis, meaning that as a university became more
public, it expended more dollars per degree awarded, even after accounting for the effects of
quality.
H2:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through competition
for students. Managers at public universities will perceive less competition for students
than will managers at private universities.
The quantitative data analyzed do not provide sufficient evidence to support this

hypothesis. Two of the structural equation models indicated a very weak positive relationship
and two indicated a very weak negative relationship. Two models indicated a statistically
significant relationship, but two others indicated the effect size was not statistically significant.
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H3:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through competition
for students. The more competition a university faces for students, the more efficient the
university will be.
The quantitative data analyzed do not provide sufficient evidence to support this

hypothesis. Two of the structural equation models indicated a very weak positive relationship
and two indicated a very weak negative relationship. Two models indicated a statistically
significant relationship at 95% confidence, but one indicated the effect size was not statistically
significant.

H4:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through personal
motivation for efficiency. Managers at public universities will be less motivated to make
the university operate more efficiently than will be managers at private universities.
After performing ten semi-structured in depth interviews with five private university

administrators and five public university administrators, no evidence was found to support this
hypothesis. Neither private nor public university administrators were aware of any incentives
offered by their universities to behave in efficient ways.
H5:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through personal
motivation for efficiency. The more managers are motivated to increase efficiency, the
more efficient the university will be.
There is not sufficient data to provide evidence for this hypothesis. More variability is

needed in terms of the incentive structure facing managers before meaningful comparisons may
be made.

H6:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through bureaucratic
motivation for inefficiency. Managers at public universities will perceive more
bureaucratic motivation for inefficiency than will managers at private universities.
The qualitative interviews do provide some evidence that managers at public universities

are more aware of the perverse budgetary influences on university efficiency. A clear pattern
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emerged among public university interview subjects concerning the "use it or lose it," nature of
budgeted funds, where no such pattern emerged for private university interview subjects.

H7:

The relationship between publicness and efficiency will be mediated through bureaucratic
motivation for inefficiency. The more managers perceive bureaucratic motivation for
inefficiency, the less efficient the university will be.
The combination of the qualitative interviews and the quantitative analysis provides some

evidence that this might be the case. The combination of evidence from H1 and H6 implies that
budgetary incentives may be the mechanism through which publicness impacts inefficiency.
IV.2 Limitations
Like all research, the current study makes deliberate choices about what research
questions to answer, and what methods to use to answer those questions. In making these
choices, limitations on the research are introduced.
With regard to the quantitative analysis, some data points are missing or appear to be
reported in an inconsistent manner in the IPEDS database. The overall number of missing data
points was less than 1%. Unfortunately, IPEDS represents the best available source of secondary
comparative data available to researchers interested in examining postsecondary education in the
United States.
Also with respect to the quantitative analysis, not every national university in the United
States was analyzed. This is, again, partly due to data limitations, but was also partially a
conscious choice based on marginal returns to collecting additional data. Some of the smaller
national universities do not report data consistently to IPEDS, and/or do not contain a score on
the U.S. News and World Report index, and therefore would not have a quality control value for
two of the structural models.
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Because the measure for efficiency is constructed so broadly, and also because the
national universities examined are geographically and structurally diverse, the research may not
uncover meaningful data trends at a regional or other sub-national levels, or for specific subsets
of efficiency.
With respect to the qualitative interviews, time and resource constraints, primarily time
constraints of the interview subjects, prevented detailed follow-up conversations to further
explore emerging trends. Also, data was collected, transcribed, and coded by a single researcher,
so it is subject to bias or error introduction. To guard against these errors, voice recognition
software was used to assist with transcription, and a standardized script was used for all
interview subjects.
IV.3 Contributions to Knowledge
The current research provides evidence to support the popular notion that private
producers are more efficient in production than are public producers. The quantitative analysis is
strong evidence in terms of internal validity within the context of national universities, and the
results are likely generalizable to other types of universities in the United States.
Importantly, the research also clarifies that competition is not always the mediating
mechanism for differences in efficiency between the public and private sector. This highlights a
boundary condition of the X-Inefficiency theory, which is that its explanatory power only holds
if there is direct competition in the market between producers.
The research indicates that private and public national universities in the United States
are likely competing for different pools of students based on quality. It may also be the case that
universities are competing for students on the basis of qualities other than efficiency. In either
case, because the universities are not directly competing for the same students, the level of
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competition they face is not a good explanation The research also provides some evidence to
support that Niskanen's budget-maximizing theory has validity in the context of postsecondary
education in U.S. national universities.
IV.4 Contributions to Practice
As with all engaged scholarship research, the aim of this study is not only to contribute to
academic knowledge, but also to make meaningful contributions to practice as well (Van de Ven
2007). In terms of practical advice to public university administrators, the research highlights
three important areas.
Firstly, there is room for public university administrators to improve the efficiency of
their universities without sacrificing quality. The experience of private universities provides
evidence that this is possible. Improving efficiency, while perhaps not a primary goal for the
university, should be considered as part of an overall strategic mission. Increasing efficiency can
translate into keeping tuition costs as low as possible, and maintaining access to higher education
for a broader segment of society. This will become increasingly important for public universities
as state appropriations are reduced in the face of tight fiscal constraints.
Both public and private universities would benefit from a focus on defining, measuring,
and understanding efficiency from the point of view of the university. Administrators are not at
all familiar with thinking in these terms. Before any improvement can be made, efficiency must
be measured in a meaningful way and administrators must think in terms of how their actions
impact efficiency.
Public universities in particular should re-examine the ways in which they allocate budget
across the university. De-centralized budgeting with little or no cross-subsidization through
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indirect cost allocation can act as a moderating influence on administrators' budget-maximizing
actions. This, in turn, may lead to greater efficiency for the university.
IV.5 Public Policy Recommendations
Policy makers might consider some recommendations based in part on the findings of
this research. Firstly, there is a need for more consistent and reliable reporting from universities
in the United States. While the IPEDS database and mandatory federal reporting tied to receipt
of federal dollars has helped, there is great room for improvement. The data collection and
reporting mechanisms in place in the United Kingdom are perhaps considered burdensome by
universities, but they provide a much richer base of data from which to conduct meaningful
research.
More generally, policy makers must consider larger questions such as, what is the
appropriate role of postsecondary educational institutions in the United States. Clearly, increases
in tuition are unsustainable at current rates, and act as a threat to affordability and accessibility
for large segments of the population. The need for efficiency must not dominate public policy so
as to become the primary reason for education at the expense of quality, but its importance must
be recognized in terms of preserving accessibility. Instituting standardized measures and
reporting requirements for efficiency may aid in bringing attention to efficiency as a component
of overall success in delivering postsecondary education.
Finally, to stimulate measurement and achievement of efficiency in institutions of higher
education, policy makers should consider incentivizing efficiency at the university level to
encourage universities to focus on efficiency at sub-university levels. Beyond requiring
measurement of efficiency, tying financial incentives such as faster access to Pell Grant award
funds or other federal money to success on well thought out efficiency measures may provide
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impetus to universities to perform well on those measures. This should be balanced against
maximizing other objects such as quality and accessibility.
IV.6 Future Research
Future research is needed to further explore these findings. Time series data should be
examined to understand the impacts to efficiency over time as universities become more or less
public to confirm whether the findings hold over time as opposed to a point in time. More
focused, comparative research should be conducted with respect to differences between drivers
of efficiency for public universities and driver of efficiency for private universities. Researchers
should also focus on differing analyses between undergraduate and graduate education. Finally,
future researchers might consider using alternative outcome and efficiency measures such as
numbers of patents to determine if different universities are perhaps trying to maximize different
outcomes.
Additional data is needed to explore the incentive and budget-maximizing findings.
Specifically, researchers should focus on collecting survey data from a wider sample of national
universities, and administer those surveys to the highest levels of university governance. By
collecting a larger sample, it will become possible to test hypotheses related to incentives and
budget-maximizing by means of quantitative analysis as opposed to qualitative analysis only.
Finally, analysis should be done on alternative types of universities such as regional
universities to test the external validity of these results. More analysis can be done in terms of
sub-sets of universities from different areas, or with different missions. Future researchers may
also choose to focus on the distinction between size and publicness of a university by examining
cross-sectional data on large private institutions and small public institutions.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: National Universities Analyzed
RECORD
NUMBER

UNIVERSITY NAME

TYPE

INEFFICIENCY

PUBLIC
NESS

QUALITY

001

Princeton University

Private

$588,555

7%

100

002

Harvard University

Private

$409,061

10%

98

003

University of Chicago

Private

$389,780

19%

96

004

Yale University

Private

$619,381

11%

96

005

Columbia University

Private

$249,770

18%

95

006

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Private

$862,917

30%

95

007

Stanford University

Private

$799,678

24%

95

008

University of Pennsylvania

Private

$358,767

22%

93

009

Duke University

Private

$463,776

22%

92

010

California Institute of Technology

Private

$1,090,404

54%

91

011

Dartmouth College

Private

$435,269

13%

90

012

Johns Hopkins University

Private

$493,811

30%

90

013

Northwestern University

Private

$282,943

20%

90

014

Brown University

Private

$302,899

16%

86

015

Cornell University

Private

$242,690

18%

86

016

Rice University

Private

$276,233

14%

86

017

Vanderbilt University

Private

$507,507

40%

86

018

University of Notre Dame

Private

$225,109

6%

85

019

Washington University in St. Louis

Private

$574,746

17%

85

020

Georgetown University

Private

$203,162

10%

80

021

Emory University

Private

$369,231

32%

78
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022

University of California-Berkeley

Public

$218,706

40%

78

023

University of California-Los Angeles

Public

$331,697

34%

78

024

University of Southern California

Private

$221,562

16%

78

025

Carnegie Mellon University

Private

$225,071

19%

76

026

University of Virginia

Public

$183,959

22%

76

027

Wake Forest University

Private

$473,702

16%

75

028

University of Michigan-Ann Arbor

Public

$213,603

36%

74

029

Tufts University

Private

$216,881

16%

72

030

New York University

Private

$273,271

11%

71

031

University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Public

$283,658

57%

71

032

Boston College

Private

$150,805

5%

70

033

College of William and Mary

Public

$126,407

30%

70

034

Brandeis University

Private

$128,916

14%

68

035

Georgia Institute of Technology

Public

$243,287

53%

68

036

University of Rochester

Private

$266,049

31%

68

037

Boston University

Private

$146,467

15%

67

038

Case Western Reserve University

Private

$294,497

38%

67

039

University of California-Santa Barbara

Public

$138,396

45%

67

040

Northeastern University

Private

$112,713

10%

66

041

Tulane University

Private

$142,229

21%

66

042

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Private

$210,657

20%

65

043

University of California-Irvine

Public

$165,147

40%

65

044

University of California-San Diego

Public

$324,224

46%

65

045

University of Florida

Public

$192,393

43%

65

70

046

Lehigh University

Private

$170,959

11%

64

047

Pepperdine University

Private

$117,491

1%

64

048

University of California-Davis

Public

$236,949

48%

64

049

University of Miami

Private

$367,678

25%

64

050

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Public

$246,469

39%

64

051

Villanova University

Private

$107,497

2%

64

052

Pennsylvania State University-University
Park

Public

17%

63

053

University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign

Public

$171,505

33%

63

054

Ohio State University-Columbus

Public

$163,510

37%

62

055

University of Georgia

Public

$102,368

46%

62

056

George Washington University

Private

$157,765

14%

61

057

Purdue University-West Lafayette

Public

$135,384

36%

61

058

University of Connecticut

Public

$178,901

49%

61

059

University of Texas-Austin

Public

$145,795

34%

61

060

University of Washington

Public

$221,973

42%

61

061

Brigham Young University-Provo

Private

$108,408

2%

60

062

Fordham University

Private

$99,579

3%

60

063

Southern Methodist University

Private

$130,889

5%

60

064

Syracuse University

Private

$107,912

9%

60

065

University of Maryland-College Park

Public

$156,090

57%

60

066

Worcester Polytechnic Institute

Private

$198,405

14%

60

067

Clemson University

Public

$134,110

36%

59

068

University of Pittsburgh

Public

$183,807

38%

58

069

American University

Private

$120,643

4%

57

$174,909

71

070

Rutgers University-New Brunswick

Public

$169,983

54%

57

071

Stevens Institute of Technology

Private

$81,877

16%

57

072

Texas A&M University-College Station

Public

$200,246

38%

57

073

University of Minnesota-Twin Cities

Public

$193,238

45%

57

074

Virginia Tech

Public

$133,166

46%

57

075

Baylor University

Private

$129,902

076

Colorado School of Mines

Public

$143,144

25%

56

077

University of Massachusetts-Amherst

Public

$112,425

47%

56

078

Miami University-Oxford

Public

$84,627

17%

55

079

Texas Christian University

Private

$110,668

2%

55

080

University of Iowa

Public

$187,092

40%

55

081

Clark University

Private

$78,804

4%

54

082

Florida State University

Public

$81,277

64%

54

083

Michigan State University

Public

$156,047

31%

54

084

North Carolina State University-Raleigh

Public

$144,473

55%

54

085

University of California-Santa Cruz

Public

$121,909

61%

54

086

University of Delaware

Public

$139,748

16%

54

087

Binghamton University-SUNY

Public

$86,085

57%

53

088

University of Denver

Private

$93,479

5%

53

089

University of Tulsa

Private

$160,324

3%

53

090

Indiana University-Bloomington

Public

$124,287

29%

52

091

Marquette University

Private

$111,616

4%

52

092

University of Colorado-Boulder

Public

$167,202

36%

52

093

University of San Diego

Private

$106,141

4%

52

56
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094

Drexel University

Private

$109,480

9%

51

095

Saint Louis University

Private

$123,934

8%

51

096

Yeshiva University

Private

$213,134

48%

51

097

Rochester Institute of Technology

Private

$125,091

7%

50

098

Stony Brook University-SUNY

Public

$159,792

65%

50

099

SUNY College of Environmental Science
and Forestry

Public

$151,484

73%

50

100

University at Buffalo-SUNY

Public

$415,352

63%

50

101

University of Oklahoma

Public

$147,079

41%

50

102

University of Vermont

Public

$210,980

31%

50

103

Auburn University

Public

$129,369

38%

49

104

Illinois Institute of Technology

Private

$99,237

20%

49

105

Loyola University Chicago

Private

$111,469

9%

49

106

University of New Hampshire

Public

$109,434

34%

49

107

University of Oregon

Public

$104,050

27%

49

108

University of South Carolina

Public

$102,699

37%

49

109

University of Tennessee

Public

$151,568

54%

49

110

Howard University

Private

$217,726

15%

48

111

University of Alabama

Public

$96,692

30%

48

112

University of San Francisco

Private

$100,723

1%

48

113

University of the Pacific

Private

$139,421

4%

48

114

University of Utah

Public

$235,688

39%

48

115

Arizona State University-Tempe

Public

$86,983

37%

47

116

Iowa State University

Public

$131,758

44%

47

117

Temple University

Public

$134,638

14%

47
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118

University of Kansas

Public

$164,324

42%

47

119

University of St. Thomas

Private

$82,041

1%

47

120

The Catholic University of America

Private

$116,023

11%

46

121

DePaul University

Private

$78,965

4%

46

122

Duquesne University

Private

$86,921

4%

46

123

University of Missouri

Public

$107,145

41%

46

124

Clarkson University

Private

$110,482

12%

45

125

Colorado State University

Public

$145,122

37%

45

126

Michigan Technological University

Public

$135,165

39%

45

127

Seton Hall University

Private

$100,810

4%

45

128

University of Arizona

Public

$173,917

37%

45

129

University of California-Riverside

Public

$138,961

46%

45

130

University of Dayton

Private

$119,818

25%

45

131

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Public

$187,543

47%

45

132

Hofstra University

Private

$119,513

7%

44

133

Louisiana State University-Baton Rouge

Public

$162,598

41%

43

134

Mercer University

Private

$85,085

13%

43

135

The New School

Private

$108,531

1%

43

136

Rutgers University-Newark

Public

$122,208

41%

43

137

University of Arkansas

Public

$116,078

48%

43

138

University of Cincinnati

Public

$102,131

33%

43

139

University of Kentucky

Public

$205,501

47%

43

140

George Mason University

Public

$91,128

38%

42

141

New Jersey Institute of Technology

Public

$141,770

51%

42
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142

San Diego State University

Public

$65,500

47%

42

143

University of South Florida

Public

$97,872

57%

42

144

Washington State University

Public

$130,276

49%

42

145

Kansas State University

Public

$148,085

39%

41

146

Oregon State University

Public

$136,107

35%

41

147

St. John Fisher College

Private

$68,347

2%

41

148

University of Illinois-Chicago

Public

$237,494

28%

41

149

University of Mississippi

Public

$142,781

49%

41

150

University of Texas-Dallas

Public

$98,110

29%

41

151

Adelphi University

Private

$77,383

2%

40

152

Florida Institute of Technology

Private

$91,798

7%

40

153

Ohio University

Public

$67,958

34%

40

154

Seattle Pacific University

Private

$57,835

2%

40

155

University at Albany-SUNY

Public

$113,724

70%

40

156

Oklahoma State University

Public

$115,956

49%

39

157

University of Massachusetts-Lowell

Public

$114,401

40%

39

158

University of Rhode Island

Public

$103,515

37%

39

159

Biola University

Private

$98,935

1%

38

160

Illinois State University

Public

$99,066

23%

38

161

University of Alabama-Birmingham

Public

$286,291

65%

38

162

University of Hawaii-Manoa

Public

$185,990

71%

38

163

University of La Verne

Private

$38,492

1%

38

164

University of Maryland-Baltimore County

Public

$109,039

55%

38

165

Immaculata University

Private

$54,846

2%

37
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166

Maryville University of St. Louis

Private

167

Missouri University of Science &
Technology

Public

168

St. John's University

Private

169

University of California-Merced

170

$46,123

1%

37

40%

37

$126,580

2%

37

Public

$220,828

54%

37

University of Louisville

Public

$208,256

38%

37

171

Mississippi State University

Public

$151,217

55%

36

172

Rowan University

Public

$169,448

44%

36

173

University of Central Florida

Public

$64,571

61%

36

174

University of Idaho

Public

$148,723

60%

36

175

Virginia Commonwealth University

Public

$118,900

55%

36

176

Kent State University

Public

$66,925

36%

35

177

Robert Morris University

Private

$70,736

3%

35

178

Texas Tech University

Public

$104,217

17%

35

179

Union University

Private

$41,776

0%

35

180

University of Hartford

Private

$74,773

4%

35

181

Edgewood College

Private

$70,550

2%

34

182

Lesley University

Private

$74,692

3%

34

183

Lipscomb University

Private

$76,506

1%

34

184

Suffolk University

Private

$82,750

2%

34

185

University of Maine

Public

$169,365

49%

34

186

University of Wyoming

Public

$166,651

65%

34

187

Azusa Pacific University

Private

$72,324

0%

33

188

Ball State University

Public

$82,178

43%

33

189

Montclair State University

Public

$76,688

36%

33

$89,169
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190

Pace University

Private

$91,240

3%

33

191

West Virginia University

Public

$125,773

37%

33

192

Andrews University

Private

$96,002

4%

32

193

Indiana University-Purdue UniversityIndianapolis

Public

$146,680

39%

32

194

University of Houston

Public

$113,176

26%

32

195

University of New Mexico

Public

$203,417

51%

32

196

University of North Dakota

Public

$135,330

38%

32

197

Widener University

Private

$93,255

3%

32

198

New Mexico State University

Public

$129,051

52%

31

199

North Dakota State University

Public

$134,187

44%

31

200

Nova Southeastern University

Private

$83,305

5%

31

201

University of North Carolina-Charlotte

Public

$69,271

58%

31

202

Bowling Green State University

Public

$72,925

37%

30

203

California State University-Fullerton

Public

$65,890

58%

30

204

Dallas Baptist University

Private

$73,770

1%

30

205

University of Massachusetts-Boston

Public

$121,396

42%

30

206

University of Nevada-Reno

Public

$148,574

53%

30

207

Central Michigan University

Public

$67,073

31%

29

208

East Carolina University

Public

$98,193

62%

29

209

Florida A&M University

Public

$104,689

71%

29

210

Montana State University

Public

$141,154

44%

29

211

University of Alaska-Fairbanks

Public

$343,343

67%

29

212

University of Colorado-Denver

Public

$283,016

40%

29

213

University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth

Public

$104,244

48%

29
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214

University of Montana

Public

$92,193

46%

29

215

Western Michigan University

Public

$100,474

32%

29

216

Florida International University

Public

$78,818

53%

28

217

Louisiana Tech University

Public

$87,622

35%

28

218

South Dakota State University

Public

$113,788

42%

28

219

Southern Illinois University-Carbondale

Public

$146,210

34%

28

220

University of Alabama-Huntsville

Public

$169,964

67%

28

221

University of Missouri-Kansas City

Public

$115,902

38%

28

222

Utah State University

Public

$114,120

63%

28

223

Ashland University

Private

$76,642

0%

27

224

Benedictine University

Private

$43,301

17%

27

225

California State University-Fresno

Public

$76,247

65%

27

226

Gardner-Webb University

Private

$47,892

3%

27

227

Georgia State University

Public

$84,282

46%

27

228

Shenandoah University

Private

$68,730

3%

27

229

University of South Dakota

Public

$97,503

43%

27

230

Wayne State University

Public

$147,894

43%

27
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Appendix B: Interview Guide
This guide is for semi-structured interviews, administered either in person or over the
telephone and lasting between 30 and 60 minutes. The role of the interviewer is to put the
respondent at ease, and to gently re-direct the conversation if it drifts into unproductive areas.
Aside from these restrictions, the respondent may speak freely about the concepts they feel are
most important.
1. Tell me a little about yourself and your role at the university.
2. I am interested in the efficiency of universities. By efficiency, I mean the cost the
university incurs per degree awarded. Can you talk a little bit about the relative
importance of efficiency at your university? Is it a major focus, an interesting metric,
or something that is mostly ignored?
3. Tell me a little bit about your own personal motivation to increase efficiency. If the
university were to become more efficient, would that translate into personal gain for
you? If the university were to reward you personally for increases in efficiency, what
types of rewards would you consider motivating?
4. Tell me a little bit about the way in which the university allocates budgetary resources.
Are there aspects of the budgeting process which either encourage or discourage people
from acting in an efficient way? Specifically, what happens to a budgetary unit if they
spend less or more than their allocated budget in each year?
5. Tell me a little bit about alternative academic calendars, or alternative methods of
course delivery such as online learning. Are those practiced at your university? Do
you feel that non-traditional course delivery may translate to reduced quality of the
educational experience?
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6. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about efficiency at your university?
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Appendix C: PLS-SEM Model 1

81

Appendix D: PLS-SEM Model 2
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Appendix E: PLS-SEM Model 3
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Appendix F: PLS-SEM Model 4

84

Appendix G: Regression for H1 and H3

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.719924301
R Square
0.518291
Adjusted R Square 0.511868213
Standard Error
92618.87834
Observations
229
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

3
225
228
Coefficients

Intercept
Publicness
Competition
Quality

-140,129
1,535
629
4,668

SS
MS
F
2.07668E+12 6.92228E+11 80.69565853
1.93011E+12 8578256625
4.00679E+12
Standard Error

t Stat

22507.3459 6.225920664
312.7990976 4.908045822

P-value
2.31971E-09
1.76588E-06

459.6059085 1.369562664 0.172188791
584.7879652 7.982546743 7.30564E-14

Significance
F
1.78572E-35

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

184481.1018 -95776.7981
918.8418537 2151.622754
276.2234848 1535.14167
3515.735512 5820.459022

Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
184481.1018 -95776.7981
918.8418537 2151.622754
276.2234848 1535.14167
3515.735512 5820.459022
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Appendix H: Regression for H2

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.813256757
R Square
0.661386553
Adjusted R
Square
0.658389974
Standard Error
13.40478012
Observations
229
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
Publicness
Quality

2
226
228

Coefficients
8.043484398
0.011646793
1.026717197

SS
MS
F
79319.32106 39659.66053 220.7138587
40609.51737
179.68813
119928.8384
Standard
Error

t Stat

P-value

Significance
F
7.18745E-54

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

3.213259307 2.503216713 0.01301425 14.37526405 1.711704743
0.045264952 0.257302665 0.797179249 0.100842116 0.077548531
0.049989944 20.5384746 1.36706E-53
0.9282112 1.125223194

Lower 95.0%
14.37526405
0.100842116
0.9282112

Upper 95.0%
1.711704743
0.077548531
1.125223194
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Appendix I: IRB
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PROFESSIONAL SUMMARY
Over fifteen years of professional work history including ten years of management experience
 Strong private and public sector experience in transportation, tolling, budgeting, and finance
 Proven ability to analyze complex information and make calculated risk decisions facing uncertainty
 Demonstrated leadership abilities under extreme stress including live combat situations

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY
LEGISLATIVE
FISCAL ANALYST

KY LEGISTLATIVE
RESEARCH COMMISSION

3/2016 TO PRESENT

Frankfort, KY

Provide expert nonpartisan advice to lawmakers on various aspects of the Commonwealth's budget
Conduct professional research project and white papers for policy issues related to the budget
Draft statutory and budgetary language for consideration and passage by the General Assembly
Lead and participate in cooperative training sessions with legislative staff from other states

ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT
FINANCIAL CONSULTANT

HNTB

3/2016 TO PRESENT

Frankfort, KY

Provide financial and tolling advice to new and existing public sector clients across the country
Clients include DOTs and toll agencies in Texas, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Virginia
Activities include cost benefit analysis, tolling feasibility studies, strategic plans, and lane audits
Member of the Smart Columbus team awarded a $40M grant from USDOT

INNOVATIVE FINANCE
MANAGER

KY TRANSPORTATION
CABINET

4/2014 TO 3/2016

Frankfort, KY

Hired as the Cabinet’s first ever Innovative Finance Manager to oversee mega projects
Work simultaneously on the Louisville Bridges and Brent Spence Bridge Projects
Assisted in financing the largest infrastructure project in the Commonwealth’s history
Oversee construction and implementation of the state’s first ever all electronic tolling system
Act as staff for the Kentucky Public Transportation Infrastructure Authority
Represent projects to the Governor, legislative leadership, outside groups, and the public
Awarded Government Finance Officers Association award for excellence in financial reporting

DEPUTY BUDGET DIRECTOR

KY TRANSPORTATION
CABINET

4/2009 TO 4/2014

Frankfort, KY

Responsible for managing a staff of forty accountants, purchasing agents, and budget analysts in
administering the day-to-day fiscal operations of the Cabinet and developing, monitoring, and executing the
Cabinet’s approximately $2 billion capital and operating budget.
 Perform a monthly cash model analysis to forecast the liquidity position of the Road Fund.
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SECTION LEADER

UNITED STATES ARMY

8/2004 TO 11/2008

Fort Sill, OK

 Non-Commissioned Officer responsible for managing eight subordinates in the safe, accurate, and timely firing
of a 155 mm howitzer cannon.
 Leadership experience includes one year of duty in Iraq leading security teams for logistics patrols.
 Awarded the Good Conduct Medal, two Army Commendation Medals, and National Defense Medal.

PERSONAL BANKER

FIFTH THIRD BANK

5/2003 TO 8/2004

Lexington, KY

 Responsible for dispute resolution, customer account management, and consumer lending including personal
loans, automobile loans, and home equity lines of credit.
 Recognized for implementing innovative sales campaigns which contributed to my branch earning the highest
ever recorded annual profit and becoming the sales leader in the Central Kentucky region.

EDUCATION
DOCTORATE BUSINESS ADMIN

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

8/2015 - 5/2018

Atlanta, GA

MASTERS PUBLIC ADMIN

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

8/2012 – 5/2014

Lexington, KY

MASTERS ECONOMICS

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

12/2006-5/2009

Norman, OK

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

8/1999 – 5/2003

Lexington, KY

.
BS FINANCE AND ECONOMICS

INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT
 Member of the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)
 Member of the International Bridge Tunnel and Turnpike Association (IBTTA)
 Member of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Subcommittee
on Fiscal Management and Accounting
 Panel member for a National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine study on Value Capture
Toolkits for State Transportation Agencies (NCHRP Project 19-13)

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
 Board Member and Treasurer of the Sunshine Center
 Member of the Hearn Elementary Parent Teacher Association
 Frankfort Youth Instructional Baseball League Coach

